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Design Professionals-Recognizing a Duty to Inform
By Richard M. Shapiro*
INTRODUCTION
A family retains an architect to design a house that will appear as
spacious as possible given the confines of a limited construction budget.
The architect suggests, and the owners accept, a design in which the
living and dining rooms have high ceilings at the same level as the roof
line in order to make the rooms appear larger. After the house is com-
pleted and occupied the family discovers that these rooms are always
cold in winter because all the warm air rises to the ceiling and that this
situation is only partially solved by having the heat on continuously.
The board of directors of a new fixed rail rapid transit system
agrees with the recommendation of its consulting engineers that the rail
cars for the system should be designed for light weight and relatively
high speeds. After the system is in operation the board discovers that
these two design features are the primary cause of the system's poor
reliability.
In both the cases of the family and the transit system, dissatisfac-
tion does not stem from any negligence on the part of the architect or
the engineers in producing detailed designs for the projects. Instead,
dissatisfaction is the result of the client making a wrong decision con-
cerning basic design strategy because of incomplete information con-
cerning the risks of and viable alternatives to the design approach
which was followed. The complaint of the design client under these
circumstances thus begins: "If only we had known..."
This Note explores the possibility of extending to design profes-
sionals a duty to inform somewhat analogous to a physician's duty to
secure a patient's informed consent. As will be seen, breach of this
duty may be considered either a form of conventional negligence or a
novel extension of negligence leading to a new cause of action. The
distinction is not critical because the label does not affect the policy
behind recognition of an action based upon a failure to inform.
The term "design professional" includes architects, engineers, and
* B.A., 1969, Antioch College; M. Architecture, 1973, University of California at
Berkeley. Member, Third Year Class.
others who offer their services for the design of habitable structures,
industrial facilities and equipment, and a wide range of other projects.'
Given the relatively large commitments of time and money involved,
complete and comprehensible information is important to the client
who commissions even the most simple design. For larger projects
such as transit systems, power plants, and high-rise buildings, such in-
formation is critical. Many projects are becoming increasingly com-
plex, requiring coordination between many professionals and designed
elements, as well as involving long spans of time and tremendous ex-
penditures of money. In these projects, the information provided the
client concerning alternative design approaches and the implications of
these approaches in terms of time, cost and relative performance is of
special importance. Design decisions entail the commitment of increas-
ingly large quantities of labor and other resources and the costs of cor-
recting any "bad results" stemming from a client's uninformed decision
are equally great. If, after project completion, a client finds that the
complete absence or inadequacy of the information provided by the
designer has led to some form of otherwise avoidable bad result, the
designer's failure to inform should support a cause of action.
Courts have never squarely addressed the issue of informed con-
sent because the vast majority of design malpractice claims have been
decided on the basis of conventional negligence or contract doctrines.2
There is, however, considerable legal support for this form of action.
The proposed cause of action presents several problems of proof, but
analysis and experience in other contexts has shown that these
problems are manageable.3 In addition, public policy indicates that
benefits resulting from a duty to inform outweigh any burdens the duty
would impose upon design professionals.
The Context
The construction industry is in a state of change which is reflected
I. The most visible designer, the architect, has been defined as a person who "plans,
sketches and presents the complete details for the erection, enlargement, or alteration of a
building or other structure for the use of the contractor or builder when expert knowledge
and skill are required in such preparation." McGill v. Carlos, 39 Ohio Op. 502, 505, 81
N.E.2d 726, 729 (1947).
The actual design activity consists of the production of drawings and written documents
which define the scale and relationship of project components as well as the nature of the
materials, and the structural, mechanical, electrical, and any other systems or aspects of the
project. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRAC-
TICE, ch. II, at 3, 7-8 (1969 ed.) [hereinafter cited as A.I.A. HANDBOOK].
2. The vast majority of design malpractice claims have been decided on the basis of
conventional negligence doctrine with only occasional reliance on contract. See note 18
ihfra.
3. See text accompanying notes 34-45 infra.
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in the relationships between architects and engineers and their clients.
The most apparent change is the general trend toward holding all pro-
fessional service providers more accountable for the results of their ef-
forts. This trend is reflected in the recent twenty percent per year
increase in the number of malpractice suits against architects and
engineers.4
Within the design professions there have been significant changes
in the design and construction processes, particularly with respect to
larger and more complex projects. The image of the architect as master
builder, the sole source of all decisions including structural systems,
erection techniques, and the design of doors and downspouts,5 has
faded. The focus of design activities is shifting instead toward the defi-
nition of the broad performance goals of the contemplated project and
the coordination of a multidisciplinary -team effort to achieve these
goals.
The architect or engineer in charge of a project has always been
responsible for investigating, in addition to the client's stated needs, the
context of the client's project, including functional, aesthetic and budg-
etary requirements. 6 Additional factors relevant to a specific design in-
clude topography, seismic activity, and conditions imposed by public
regulation. The product is a "program," that is, a verbal synthesis of
needs and requirements, as well as a restatement of the problems to
which the final design is intended to respond.7 The architect's tradi-
tional services have also included production of the contract documents
consisting of "working drawings," detailed design drawings that de-
scribe the sizes and relative locations of all structural and spatial com-
ponents, and "specifications," written statements of material quality
and construction techniques.8 If the instructions in these documents
are diligently implemented by the builder, the structure should func-
4. Goldberger, Architectural Adalpractice Suits Reporied Increasing 209% a Year, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1978, at 1, coL 1. This article also reports a finding that almost 30% of
insured architecture or engineering concerns were sued in 1976.
5. The famous 18th century English architect Robert Adam ran a firm with between
2,000 and 3,000 employees and controlled subsidiary businesses supplying brick, stone, and
lumber. Huxtable, A Tastemaker Rescuedfrom History, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1978, § D at
23, coL 3. Frank Lloyd-Wright, though not a contractor, often had a member of his firm live
at the construction site in order to give continuous supervision. See J. SERGEANT, FRANK
LLOYD WRIGHT's UsoNLAN HousEs 112 (1976). For a suit against a designer-builder, see
Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 126 P. 351 (1912).
6. See A.I.A. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, ch. 5, at 3 (1963 ed.), and ch. 11, at 7-8 (1969
ed.). See also American Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between
Owner and Architect, art. 1, (AIA Doc. B141) (1977 ed.).
7. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
8. A.I.A. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, ch. 11, at 7-8 (1969 ed.). Working drawings and
specifications are together known as the contract documents. Id, ch. 4, at "1 (1972 ed.).
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tion or "perform" in a manner which responds to the problems stated
in the program.
Although this relation between designer, builder, and client is
reminiscent of the traditional master builder image of the architect, the
nature of the services actually rendered necessarily has changed as the
type of contruction activities involving designers has become centered
on larger and more complex projects. For example, it is increasingly
difficult for the architect to stay fully informed of all aspects of con-
struction because of continuing changes in materials and equipment
technology, availability, and relative costs, and the compounding of
these variables by geographic differences. Primarily in response to this
problem, in addition to the traditional employment of other profession-
als for structural and mechanical equipment engineering as well as
landscape design, architects or engineers in charge of project design
now commonly employ special consultants for the design of such items
as graphics, kitchens, and parking areas. The final working drawings
and specifications produced by the architect will usually incorporate
the information provided by these consultants. Instead of serving as
the original source of all these details, therefore, the focus of the lead
designer's role shifts toward defining the results required of the project
and then orchestrating the multidisciplinary effort required to achieve
those results.9 If one person in this process is to bear the responsibility
for keeping the client informed of the work of this team, that person is
logically the lead designer. When the implications of the choices made
by the design consultants are beyond the knowledge of the lead de-
signer, this information should be communicated to the client. Re-
sponsibility for directly informing the client of risks and alternatives
may then shift to the consulting designer or engineer.
Among the important innovations in the form of designers' serv-
ices is the use of performance specifications rather than detailed work-
ing drawings and specifications as the end product of the design
process. This approach is typical of such recent large projects as the
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit System and the building pro-
grams for certain Veteran's Administration hospitals, and school and
junior college districts. 10 These performance specifications illustrate
the importance of the architect or design engineer as the owner's agent
and advisor, as well as the significance of a full disclosure of informa-
tion concerning risks and alternatives. The designer's effort produces a
set of more generalized descriptions of the results required from the
completed structure and the general type of components to be used to
achieve those results. The builder is still told what to build, particu-
9. See A.I.A. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, ch. 4, at 3 (1972 ed.).
10. See Arnold, Rabeneck & Brindle, Building Systems Design, 41 ARCHITECTURAL
DESIGN 679, 683-93 (1971).
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larly in terms of overall configuration and dimensions, but is not pro-
vided with detailed descriptions of every component required.
Detailed design is instead left to the builder or component supplier on
the basis that this participant in the construction process is in a better
position than the designer to choose materials and construction tech-
niques best suited to local conditions."1
Another important innovation in the design and construction
process is the use of a new professional, the "construction manager," to
complement and sometimes supplement the services of the designer.
The construction manager often has a contracting background and is
typically selected on the basis of familiarity with the type of construc-
tion contemplated. Involved in the project from the commencement of
design, the construction manager provides guidance for the owner and
designer during the design phase in such matters as costs, material
availability, scheduling, construction techniques, and alternate sources
of materials and services. The construction manager may also coordi-
nate major contracts and perform on-site inspection of the work.'2 The
trend toward employing this additional agent indicates the awareness
of owners that the designing architect or engineer either cannot, or will
not, provide-all the information necessary to make informed decisions
about the construction process. The willingness of clients to spend the
extra fees for these services also shows the importance of this type of
information, particularly for major projects.' 3 It should be noted that
11. In the pioneering California School Construction Systems Development Project
(SCSD), for example, the designer's work consisted of developing specifications for the per-
formance of certain critical components of school buildings, including structure, ceiling,
lighting, and heating systems in terms of certain performance criteria. These criteria in-
cluded noise generation or control, span, weight, and compatibility with other components.
The critical components then served as building blocks for use by other designers in the
planning of individual schools. Responsibility for detailed design was allocated to any ma-
terial or component supplier who desired to be eligible as a qualified sub-contractor for the
construction of these buildings. In preparing the performance specifications for the SCSD
project, the designers made only those decisions which determined the general nature of
critical components with respect to characteristics such as weight, strength, sound ab-
sorbance or transmission, and the dimensions of a typical module or unit. See generally
EDUCATIONAL FAcILmES LABORATORIES, SCSD: THE PRoJEcr AND THE SCHOOLS (1967);
Arnold, Rabeneck & Brindle, Building Systems Design, 41 ARcurrEcTURAL DESIGN 679,
679-93 (1971).
12. See generally U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, THE G.S.A. SYSTEM FOR
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT (April, 1975); American Institute of Architects, General
Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Construction Management Edition (AIA Doc.
A201/CM) (1975 ed.); Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction
Manager (AIA Doc. B801) (1973 ed.).
13. Recent examples of projects using this system include the San Francisco Bay Area
Rapid Transit System, the Port of New York Authority World Trade Center, several large
buildings constructed for the General Services Administration, and many power-plant
projects and materials processing facilities.
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employment of a construction manager in no way absolves the design-
ing architect or engineer of responsibility for fully informing the client
of the risks and alternatives involved in those areas of professional
service for which the architect or engineer retains responsibility. In
fact, the architect may also perform the role of construction manager.14
Whatever the arrangement, most clients need and want all available
information concerning their project, subject to reasonable time and
cost constraints, and they naturally look to the designer to provide it.
Bases of the Proposed Cause of Action
The cause of action proposed in this Note would permit a design
professional's client to sue in tort for economic harm resulting from the
inadequate performance of the designed structure. The client would
allege that this harm arose from significant design decisions, that the
designer had a duty to inform the client of either the material risks
inherent in the decision or the availability of reasonable alternatives,
and that the damage would have been avoided or mitigated but for the
design professional's negligent failure to so inform.
In considering the practicality of the duty which flows from recog-
nition of a cause of action for failure to inform, two general areas must
be addressed: (1) public policy bases and implications, and (2) the
problems of proof presented. This section addresses the first area by
considering the availability and usefulness of existing legal remedies,
the factors which have led to the recognition of an analogous legal duty
in other contexts, and a number of more general considerations includ-
ing sociological models of professionalism, the likely impact of the duty
upon design practices including the costs associated with the proposed
duty, and the means available to allocate these costs. Each area of con-
sideration raises arguments both for and against legal recognition of
the proposed duty. It is submitted that, on balance, arguments in favor
of recognition weigh more heavily.
Present Judicial and Professional Standards of Practice
The duty to inform proposed in this Note both supplements and
overlaps ordinary negligence doctrine while approaching a standard
similar to that applied by the law of agency. The courts have ap-
proached recognition of a duty to inform as applied in limited contexts
but have never squarely examined the possibility of considering a fail-
ure to inform a legitimate claim of negligence. The legal status of the
14. f. American Institute of Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Con-
struction, Construction Management Edition, (AIA Doe. A201/CM) (1975 ed.); American
Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction
Manager, (AIA Do. BS01) (1973 ed.).
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proposed duty is reflected in, or perhaps, reflects, the attitude taken by
the design professions in the past toward a responsibility of disclosure.
The latest professional statement by architects on the subject, however,
does contain a specific acknowledgement of the importance of commu-
nicating information concerning risks and alternatives to clients.
Typical malpractice complaints are based upon a standard of care
requiring professionals to exercise that degree of care, skill, and judg-
ment which is common to the profession.15 Among the first cases to
make the analogy between the standard of care required of architects
and that demanded of other professionals was Chapel v. Clark,16 which
provided a classical statement of the applicable standard, This standard
was recently endorsed and restated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
City of Mounds View v. Walifarvi:'7
Architects, doctors, engineers, attorneys, and others deal in some-
what inexact sciences and are continually called upon to exercise
their skilled judgment in order to anticipate and provide for random
factors which are incapable of precise measurement. The indetermi-
nate nature of these factors makes it impossible for professional serv-
ice people to gauge them with complete accuracy in every
instane .... Because of the inescapable possibility of error which
inheres in these services, the law has traditionally required, not per-
fect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and judgment which
can be reasonably expected from similarly situated professionals.' s
15. See, g, cases cited in Note, Liabiliy of Design Professionals-The Necessity of
Fault, 58 IowA L. REv. 1221, 1228 n.47 (1973). See also Bayshore Dev. Co. v. Bonfoey, 75
Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918); Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 36 A. 104 (1896); R.STATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTs § 299A (1965).
16. 117 Mich. 638, 640, 76 N.W. 62, 62 (1898).
17. 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978).
18. See generally W. PROSSE, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 32, at 161-62 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PROssER].
A corollary of this standard of care is that those who sell professional services are not
liable for bad results in the absence of negligence because they are not warrantors of the
results of the services provided. Former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger
Traynor is often quoted to the effect that "the general rule is applicable that those who sell
their services for the guidance of others in their economic, financial, and personal affairs are
not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct .... Those who hire such
persons are not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care and
competence. They purchase service, not insurance." Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487-
89, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (1954). Seegenerally Annot., 25 A.L.R. 2d 1085, 1092 (1952); see also
Looker v. Gulf Coast Fair, 203 Ala. 42, 45, 81 So. 832, 835 (1919); Paxton v. County of
Alameda, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953); Bayshore Development Co. v. Bon-
foey, 75 Fla. 455, 463, 78 So. 507, 510 (1918); Chapel v. Clark, 117 Mich. 638, 640, 76 N.W.
62, 62 (1898); City of Moundsview v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 423-24 (Minn. 1978).
The argument against the application of the doctrine of implied warranty to design
professionals was also well stated in Aud$e Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt
Assoc., Inc., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964): "An engineer, or any other so called
professional, does not warrant his service or the tangible evidence of his skill to be mer-
chantable or fit for an intended use. These are terms uniquely applicable to goods. Rather,
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The proposed cause of action may be seen as a variation of typical
claims for negligence in design or in preparation of plans and specifica-
tions. The primary distinction between an action for failure to inform
and an ordinary negligence claim is that the duty to inform focuses on
the nature of the communication between designer and client rather
than on the quality of the contract documents themselves. Except for
dicta in two cases,' 9 the courts do not appear to have recognized that
the quality of the communication between designer and client can and
should be in issue.
The one area in which designers commonly make express repre-
sentations concerning the anticipated results of their work is maximum
project costs, since costs can be stated in objective terms, dollars. As a
result, courts have been willing to hold that failure to meet agreed-
upon costs may constitute a breach of contract rather than negligence.2 0
in the preparation of design and specifications as the basis of construction, the engineer or
architect warrants that he will or has exercised his skill according to a certain standard of
care, that he acted reasonably and without neglect. Breach of this warranty occurs if he was
negligent. Accordingly, the elements of an action for negligence and for breach of the im-
plied warranty are the same. The use of the term implied warranty in these circumstances
merely introduces further confusion into an area of law where confusion abounds." Id. at
335. See also La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942-43 (3rd Cir. 1968); Gagne
v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 486-87, 275 P.2d 15, 19-20 (1954); Allied Properties v. John A.
Blume & Assoc., Eng'rs, 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 855-56, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972).
Few courts have analyzed designer's negligence as a breach of contract, although in
most instances a contract between designer and client does exist and a breach would be
actionable. See, e.g., Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 275 Ala. 35, 38, 151 So. 2d 767, 770-71
(1963) (claim against a civil engineer for fitness for intended purpose of a subdivision drain-
age plan); Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 271, 64 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1951) (against equip-
ment designer for the fitness of the design of a insulation system); Prier v. Refrigeration
Eng'r Co., 74 Wash. 2d 25, 29, 442 P.2d 621, 624 (1968) (against architect for fitness for
intended purpose of a skating rink design; cf Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sordoni Constr. Co.,
401 Pa. 358, 361-62, 164 A.2d 201, 203 (1960); Niver v. Nash, 7 Wash. 558, 561-62, 35 P. 380,
381 (1893) (lack of analysis in reaching this conclusion).
A primary motivation for the use of contract theory may be the longer statute of limita-
tions available in those states which do not, or did not, have absolute limits on actions
arising out of improvements to real estate. See note 92 infra.
19. J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Vessel Morning Star, 431 F.2d 714,722 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972) (naval architect had duty to warn owner of the potentially
negative effects of requested changes in design); Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & As-
soc., Eng'rs, 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 857 n.17, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 265 (1972) (naval architect's
breach of duty to warn is negligence, not breach of warranty). See also Kunnes v. Bryant, 49
So. 2d 872, 874 (La. Ct. App. 1951) (expert house painter has duty to warn owner of obvious
dangers of unsatisfactory results).
20. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Roberts, 296 Mich. 114, 295 N.W. 580 (1941) (meeting cost
estimate was an oral condition precedent); Durand Assoc., Inc. v. Guardian Investment Co.,
186 Neb. 349, 183 N.W.2d 246 (1971) (relying on a collateral oral agreement that cost would
not exceed a certain amount); Rose v. Shearrer, 431 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (oral
agreement of cost limit); f Zannoth v. Booth Radio Stations, Inc., 333 Mich. 233, 52
N.W.2d 678 (1952) (contract term for cost limit implied from client's statements to architect).
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This judicial attitude may well have made costs the one area of the
design process in which the profession itself has recognized a duty to
warn the client. According to the American Institute of Architects: "[I]t
is extremely important that the variables inherent in any cost projec-
tions be completely understood by the Owner and that he appreciate
the limitations that are inherent in any Statements or Estimates. '21 As
the "what" of cost estimates is easily understandable, clients are more
apt to ask "why" and designers therefore have to be more willing and
able to explain. 2
Another legal doctrine which would appear to provide an even
more attractive support for a designer's duty to inform than is provided
by conventional negligence is the characterization of the designer as the
client's "trusted agent."'-3 As an agent, the designer would be held to
have a duty to make full disclosure of all facts material to the subject of
the agency,24 the most material fact usually being cost.25 Although
analysis of the designer-client relationship as one of agent and princi-
pal clearly incorporates the proposed duty to inform, the relative infre-
quency of the use of agency doctrine reflects the general rule that
designers act as independent contractors in the preparation of plans
and specifications, 26 and are considered agents of the owner only when
supervising the actual construction.27 The assumption that courts will
21. A.I.A. HANDB OoK, supra note 1, ch. 15, at 3.
22. Given legal recognition of a duty to inform extending beyond matters of cost, it is
interesting to speculate about the means the profession might attempt to employ in order to
contractually limit liability. Even if the profession assumed that all duties to inform could
not be disclaimed on the basis that so strict a limit would be clearly against public policy, a
future contract might attempt to limit the designer's duty to explore risks and alternatives.
Notice of this type of limit on services may actually serve to benefit clients by reminding
them that there are reasonable limits on a designer's efforts and that additional costs may be
involved for more extensive explorations.
23. Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 575, 126 P. 351, 357
(1912).
24. Id.; Lane v. Harmony, 112 Me. 25, 31-32, 90 A. 546, 548-49 (1914). See generally 3
AM. JuR. 2d Agency § 200 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958); An-
not., 25 A.L.R.2d 1085, 1087 (1952).
25. See note 24 supra. See also Zannoth v. Booth Radio Stations, 333 Mich. 233, 52
N.W.2d 678 (1952) (relying on architect's role as owner's agent and related duty to inform
about costs, and on doctrine that an agreed-upon construction cost may be a condition pre-
cedent to recovery for the architect's fees). See generally Sweet & Sweet, Architectural Cost
Predictions:.A Legal and InstitutionalAnalysis, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 996 (1968).
26. E.g., Looker v. Gulf Coast Fair, 203 Ala. 42, 81 So. 832 (1919); Burke v. Ireland,
166 N.Y. 305, 59 N.E. 914 (1901); Mackay v. Benjamin Franklin Realty & Holding Co., 288
Pa. 207, 135 A. 613 (1927).
27. Trane v. Gilbert, 267 Cal. App. 2d 720, 73 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1968); cf. American
Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction
Manager, art. 1 (Doc. B801) (1973 ed.). See also Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff
Co., 163 Cal. 561, 126 P. 351 (1912); Coombs v. Beede, 89 Me. 187, 36 A. 104 (1896); Fuchs
v. Parsons Constr. Co., 172 Neb. 719, 111 N.W.2d 727 (1961).
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continue to limit application of agency doctrine provides another rea-
son for recognition of the proposed duty as the basis for a cause of
action.28
The absence of judicial consideration is reflected in, or perhaps
reflects, the profession's past attitude towards the client's right to be
informed and consulted during the design process. To the limited ex-
tent that the professional literature addressed the nature of the commu-
nication between designer and client during the design phase, its
primary concern was with what the client tells the professional. The
previous Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect,29
suggested for use by the American Institute of Architects, reflected an
almost paternalistic view of the relationship with the client. After con-
sulting with the owner "to ascertain the requirements of the Project and
confirm[ing] such requirements to the Owner," the architect was only
responsible for preparing and submitting, and the client for approving,
various design studies, cost estimates, and eventually, the contract
documents.30
The latest edition of the Owner-Architect Agreement 3' includes
changes reflecting a greater concern about the information given the
client. The architect is now given the duty, after reviewing the owner's
program, "to ascertain the requirements of the Project . . . [and to]
review the understanding of such requirements with the Owner. '32
The Architect is now charged with the essence of the proposed duty to
inform: "The Architect shall review with the Owner alternative ap-
proaches to design and construction of the Project." 33
28. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
29. American Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner
and Architect (AIA Doc. B141) (1977 ed.).
30. Id., 1.1.1 to 1.1.9. The basic thrust of the commentary in the A.I.A. HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, ch. 11 (1969 ed.), is that the architect should ensure that the client understands
what he or she is getting, not why. For example, as the "Owner's professional advisor," the
architect "advises the Owner on the best solution to his problem, in informing him of the
probable cost of the Work, in selecting systems and materials of construction, and in numer-
ous other ways. As the reading of Drawings and Specifications is almost always unfamiliar
to the Owner, the Architect should make every effort to ensure the Owner's understanding
of the Contract Documents." Id. at 4.
31. American Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner
and Architect, Doc. B141 (1977 ed.).
32. Id. 1 1.1.1.
33. ld. 1.1.3. In the chapter of the 4.L4. Handbook, entitled The Architect and Client,
the Institute suggests that "[w]hen the client is new to the building industry, the Architect
should take the time to review the building process with him in great detail. The specialized
language of the Architect and the builder must become familiar to him." A.I.A. HAND-
BOOK, supra note 1, ch. 5, at 3 (1975 ed.).
The architect's failure to so inform the client may also give the client a cause of action
for breach of contract. This Note focuses on negligence analysis, however, because of the
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Analogies from Other Legal Contexts
Courts have recognized a duty to inform clients34 for at least two
other professions, law and medicine. This duty to inform has been im-
posed on the basis of several factors which, although not strictly appli-
cable to design professionals, do provide useful analogies.
In the medical profession the principal motivation for judicial rec-
ognition of the physician's duty to inform a patient of the risks inherent
in, and the alternatives to, a particular course of treatment is an interest
in preserving an individuars right to self-determination in situations
where bodily integrity is at stake. Starting with the common law prem-
ise that any touching without consent amounted to a technical bat-
tery,35 courts have in the past twenty years come to the inevitable
conclusion that any consent which is not also knowingly made is inva-
lid.36 Thus, a patient who discovers that he or she gave consent to a
treatment without at least being informed of the significant risks and
alternatives available may state a negligence claim against the treating
physician even without resulting harm.37 .
Similar concerns with the right to individual self-determination
have led to the recognition of the importance of an attorney's informa-
tion, or its absence, in situations where the client's personal liberty may
be affected.38 Because these clients are criminal defendants, their inter-
long judicial tradition of applying tort doctrines to claims of dissatisfaction with the results
of the services of professionals. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
34. The duty to inform does not necessarily extend to third parties. See, e.g., Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364
P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1961); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1425
(1923).
35. In an emergency it is usually held that consent is "implied" or unnecessary. See D.
LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE 9.05, at 255 (1977).
36. The development of this doctrine is traced in Meisel, The Expansion of Liabilityfor
MedicalAccidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way ofInformed Consent, 56 NEB.
L. REv. 51, 82-86 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Meisel].
37. It remains necessary to prove the existence of damage as well as causation. See text
accompanying note 67 infra. Professor Goldstein argues that protection of human interests
in personal dignity is sufficient grounds for strict liability for a physician's failure to inform,
even in the absence of measurable damage, Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Re/lec-
tions on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J.
683, 685-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
38. The clients in such circumstances are usually criminal defendants who have waived
"fundamental" or "inherently personal" rights, Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir.
1973), through plea bargaining or for other tactical reasons, see, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258 (1973) (failure to challenge discrimination in grand juror selection); Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (failure to contemporaneously object to the introduction of
illegal evidence); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (failure to exhaust state remedies before
petitioning for federal relief); U.S. v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976) (failure to warn
of possible conflicts of interest of attorney representing co-defendants); Bonds v. Wain-
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est in self-determination is supplemented by the constitutional require-
ment of due process. 39 The remedy for a failure to inform claim
against an attorney in such situations is an opportunity for the client to
withdraw the plea, and perhaps sue the counsel for malpractice. 40
The analogy between medical patients and criminal defendants on
one hand and design clients on the other is of only limited usefulness.
The primary motivation for recognizing the physician's and the attor-
ney's duty to inform does not apply to design professionals because of
the difference in importance of the interests involved, the risk of bodily
harm or deprivation of liberty as compared to economic loss. In addi-
tion, there is not the same imbalance of power between professional
and client in the area of design. Designers are not, as one commentator
has characterized physicians and attorneys, persons "who, because of
their special skills, training and status, may be overbearing in their re-
lationships with generally less powerful, often highly vulnerable, per-
sons.' '4 ' Other than a few nonprofit organizations, designers' clients
may very well be wealthier and more worldly than the professionals
they hire.
The absence of an imbalance of power in designer-client relation-
ship may therefore diminish the emotional imperative for judicial in-
tervention on the client's behalf. The design client's needs tend to be
highly individualized, however, even when the client is actually a com-
mittee of a large institution, or in situations, such as speculative devel-
opment,42 where the final user is unknown. Although the client does
not put his or her bodily interests at risk when retaining a designer, it
should not be assumed that clients abdicate the right to final decisions
on significant design issues without express agreement. Designers
make at least as many decisions when rendering their services as do
physicians or attorneys when rendering theirs. These decisions are not
made in the charged atmosphere of an operating room or a court room
wright, 564 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on rehearing, 579 F.2d 317 (1978) (failure to
exercise appellate rights), and then claim, often in habeus corpus petitions, that the waiver
was not, in fact, "an intentional relinquishment of a known right," Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 439 (1963).
39. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). See generally Annot., 97
A.L.R.2d 549 (1964).
40. See Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal
Malpractice," 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1191 (1974). See also Bradshaw v. Pardee, Civ. No.
15444 (Cal. App. 3rd Div., filed Mar. 13, 1978) (criminal defendant may not maintain action
against defense attorney for professional malpractice if in fact defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted).
41. Goldstein, supra note 37, at 685. For a discussion of the duty to inform owed cli-
ents where only economic harm is involved, see Roach, The Suitability Obligations of Bro-
kers. Present Law and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1978).
42. Speculative development can be defimed as projects initiated and developed in the
hope of eventual sale to an as yet unknown final user.
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with the result that there is more time for communication with the cli-
ent and for the possibility of a less hurried resolution of uncertainties.
As a result, there is no reason to arbitrarily limit the extensive and in-
tensive interchange of information between designer and client that is
otherwise necessary.
A stronger analogy for the proposed cause of action may be drawn
from the limited number of legal malpractice cases in which the attor-
ney's failure to inform has allegedly resulted in economic harm,43 as
opposed to the loss of personal freedom. Although such claims might
have used agency law as a basis for an attorney's duty to give clients all
information material to the transaction which is the subject of the attor-
ney-client relationship, it seems such claims instead have been treated
as involving simple negligence. This is perhaps because the evidence
indicated that a reasonably prudent lawyer would not have recom-
mended or followed a course of action leading to the risks which even-
tually materialized.44
The analogies of duties to inform applied in the medical and legal
contexts are attractive but not conclusive. Economic harm is not as
strong a basis for legal intervention as is a threat of avoidable bodily
injury. There is, however, some indication that courts may be per-
suaded that adequate disclosure is a reasonable expectation to impose
upon all professionals. The cases dealing with attorney disclosure to
business clients present one example,45 and the imposition of suitability
43. See, e.g, Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494,500,502 (1879); Wittenbrock v. Parker,
102 Cal. 93, 101, 36 P. 374, 376 (1894); Selover v. Hedwall, 149 Minn. 302, 306, 184 N.W.
180, 181 (1921). This duty is now embodied in ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rry, EC 9-2 (1974).
Although this approach is a strong basis for requiring attorneys to inform their clients
of the risks and alternatives to a particular transaction, this duty has only been recognized in
one reported case in which the court held: "[L]awyers are obligated to scrutinize any con-
tract which they advise their clients to execute, and are required to disclose the full import of
the instrument and the possible consequences that may arise upon execution of it." Ramp v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 786, 269 So.2d 239, 244 (1972); accord, Smith
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (M.D. La. 1973).
The legal profession has long provided some recognition of the attorney's duty to in-
form. The prior Canons of Ethics imposed a duty upon the lawyer, after becoming fully
informed of all relevant information, to give a "candid opinion of the merits and probable
result of pending or contemplated litigation." ABA CANONS OF ETHICS, CANON 8 (adopted
August 22, 1908) (superseded). This has been replaced by ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPoNsamLrry, EC 7-8 (1969), which one commentator has paraphrased to read: "A law-
yer should use his best efforts to insure that his client makes decisions on a fully informed
basis. The lawyer should do this on his own initiative and his advice may go beyond purely
legal considerations. A lawyer should use his full experience, be complete and objective,
and discuss moral as well as legal factors in aiding his client's decision-making. A lawyer
may stress harsh consequences. . . ." R. WISE, LEOAL ETmIcs 104-05 (1970).
44. See, eg., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
45. See cases cited note 43 supra.
January 1979] DESIGN PROFESSIONALS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
obligations on securities brokers presents another.46 It is highly likely,
therefore, that a trend in the direction of requiring greater disclosure
will continue, and this trend would encourage the imposition of the
proposed duty.
Policy Considerations
In addition to the practical reasons for recognizing designers' legal
duty to inform their clients and the analogies provided by the experi-
ence in legal and medical malpractice cases, analysis of two other areas
of inquiry provides support for the proposed cause of action. The first
is a broad consideration of the roles of professionals and their clients
with a view towards enhancing the effectiveness of the service provided
and the satisfaction of the consumer with this service. The second area
of inquiry concerns the allocation of any benefits and burdens between
designers and their clients which may result from the proposed use of
the informed consent doctrine. The result of these inquiries indicates
that the general principles underlying the proposed duty are sound and
that the impact of a carefully defined cause of action will be equitable.
Models of Professionalism- Traditional vs. Partici7atory
Professionals may be defined as those who use expertise based on
knowledge and experience to render services to clients.47 Two polar
views may be advanced concerning the appropriate relationship be-
tween professionals and their clients: dependent and participatory.48 In
the traditional dependent relationship the client brings problems to a
professional, who exercises broad responsibilities. The client then re-
tires to await the professional's solution. In keeping with this paternal-
ism, any solution the professional proposes is presumed to be in the
client's best interest. As the client is only minimally involved in the
problem-solving process, this presumption imposes a heavy burden on
46. See Roach, The Suitabilidy Obligations of Brokers.- Present Law and the Proposed
Federal Securities Code, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1978).
47. According to the traditional definition, a profession is distinguished from a trade
by a primary emphasis on the public good, rather than the pecuniary gain of the individual
practitioner. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 8 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as ROSENTHAL].
48. The participatory model was first proposed by two psychiatrists as one of three
models of the doctor-patient relationship. Their first model is of an active physician and an
entirely passive patient, as when anesthesized for surgery. The second model is of a guiding
physician and a cooperating, but basically passive and dependent patient. This is equivalent
to the traditional client-professional relationship. The third model is of interdependent and
cooperating client and professional-the participatory approach. The original argument
was that each model was particularly appropriate under certain circumstances. Szasz &
Hollender, A Contribution to the Philosophy of Medicine: The Basic Models of the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 97 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 591 (1956), cited in RosENTHAL,
supra note 47, at 9-10.
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the client who disapproves of the work when it is completed, and few
clients have the knowledge and experience required to second-guess the
professionars work at this point in any event.49 The traditional model
assumes a great disparity in the ability of professionals and clients to
use information concerning the benefits, risks, and alternatives of vari-
ous problem solutions. In fact, this disparity exists, if at all, only to the
extent that training and experience provide unique decision-making ca-
pabilities. What professionals actually provide is the ability to define
benefits, risks, and alternatives, not any special skills for choosing be-
tween them. In fact, in the context of design services, frequently only
the client has the knowledge required to understand the implications of
the proposed solutions for the desired result, although the professional
must have the skill to know which questions to ask so as to focus atten-
tion on those implications. 50
The opposite of the traditional approach of dependency is one in
which both client and professional share control over all of the mean-
ingful decisions arising out of their relationship, that is, both partici-
pate in the decisions. The participatory model forms the basis for a
style of professional practice which demands that the client be included
at every stage in the problem-solving process. The duty to inform lies
at the heart of this approach.
There are a number of advantages which justify what critics would
see as the time consumption and confusion which might result under
the participatory model. Since clients have to live with the results,
there is a basic advantage to them in avoiding any unsatisfactory per-
formance which may result from the withholding of information con-
cerning risks and alternatives. 51 Furthermore, the additional
49. One commentator has characterized this traditional approach as follows:
"[P]rofessionals, in contrast to members of other occupations, claim and are often accorded
complete autonomy in their work. Since they are presumed to be the only judges of how
good their work is, no layman or other outsider can make any judgment of what they can do.
If their activities are unsuccessful, only another professional can say whether this was due to
incompetence or to the inevitable workings of nature or society by which even the most
competent practitioner would have been stymied. This image of the professionaljustifies his
demand for complete autonomy and his demand that the client give up his own judgment
and responsibility, leaving everything in the hands of the professional." H. Becker, The
Nature of a Profession, in EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS 38-39 (1962), cited in
RosmNTHA supra note 47, at 8.
50. The branch of management science concerned with decision analysis differentiates
between "good" and "bad" decisions not on the basis of satisfaction with the outcome, but
on whether the decision is consistent with the choices, available information, and prefer-
ences of the decision maker. In the absence of the requisite information with which the
proposed cause of action is concerned, it becomes impossible by definition to make "good"
decisions. See generall, Howard, Decision Analysis in Systems Engineering, in SYsTEMs
CONCEPTS: LECTRES ON CONTImPORARY APPRAOCHES TO SYSTEMS 56 (R. Miles ed.
1973).
51. Arguably there is also involved injury to what may be called a person's "dignitary"
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information provided through a participatory relationship encourages
the client to provide more focused definitions of what is needed. In
addition, the client's continuous involvement assures the client's ratifi-
cation of the professional's decisions and thereby eliminates many of
the grounds for subsequent grievances if there are bad results. Active
involvement also permits the client to make a timely evaluation of the
services being rendered; if mistakes are being made they may be caught
in time and corrected, even, perhaps, by withdrawing and selecting an-
other professional.5 2 The basic goal of the participatory model is thus
to enhance the client's satisfaction with the results of the professional's
work.5 3 To the extent that the duty to inform is an integral part of the
participatory model, the recognition of a duty to inform would further
this goal of customer satisfaction.
Burdens and Benefits
The cause of action proposed in this Note would have certain ef-
fects on the balance of power and responsibility between designers and
their clients. To the extent that a legal duty to inform results in addi-
tional burdens upon designers as potential defendants, upon the courts,
and even upon clients through increased insurance costs reflected in
fees, there must be equivalent benefits to all concerned.
One of the more obvious burdens upon professionals which might
result from the new duty could be given the general title "practicing for
the lawyers." It may be feared by some that the imposition of yet an-
other basis for professional malpractice actions will lead to the design
equivalent of "defensive medicine" with all the attendant additional
costs and formalities. If the standard of disclosure is unclear, there
may be a tendency to inundate the client with information in long,
polysyllabic minicourses on building science. 54 Such information is
costly to assemble and present, particularly as the buildings and
processing facilities designers work on become increasingly complex.55
interest. This is violated any time decisions are made for the individual without including
the subject in the process. Goldstein, supra note 37.
52. Cf. Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical
Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 124, 130 n.24 (professionals tend to view active
client choice in terms of the client's freedom to withdraw from the client-professional rela-
tionship, rather than in terms of the client's ability to make decisions within it).
53. A recent study of the handling of some 60 personal injury cases indicates a clear
increase in client satisfaction as a result of having access to full information about the impli-
cations of the problems presented and because active client participation promoted more
effective solutions. ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 169 & n.50.
54. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515
(1972).
55. Expense and confusion may be further compounded whenever the design is the
product of a team, as is typically the case. This team may consist of architects and a range of
engineers including structural, mechanical, civil, lighting, and acoustical specialists. The
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Another argument against recognition of a cause of action for a
designer's failure to inform is the resulting apocryphal "flood of litiga-
tion."56 It may well be difficult or expensive to prove negligence in the
actual design in certain cases in which there are clearly bad results, and
this difficulty will tempt plaintiffs to include a claim for failure to in-
form as a pro forma count in any negligence complaint against design-
ers. The difficulties of proving causation and damages, 57 however, may
provide some deterrent to the litigation of marginal claims. More sig-
nificantly, the deluge argument must be rejected if the purposes of tort
law are to be upheld when genuine and serious injuries have been
sustained.58
A third argument against imposing an additional basis for a de-
signer's negligence liability is that experimentation and innovation will
be discouraged because there may be no inexpensive way of determin-
ing the risks of a new technique before it is applied. If, however, any
significant uncertainties are communicated to the client, the client
would be free to approve or disapprove the proposed course of action
or to authorize the additional expenditures of time and money neces-
sary to analyze identified unknowns.
Finally, significant social and economic impacts of any tort action
hinge on the availability of insurance as a risk-spreading mechanism.
At the outset, it is reasonably certain that to the extent the recognition
of a designer's duty to inform results in an increase in the number of
actions filed against designers, the costs of malpractice insurance will
be pushed even higher, assuming such insurance continues to be avail-
able at all.59 As it becomes increasingly expensive to practice design at
least two forms of deterrence to the failure to inform will result. First,
combinations of alternatives and risk factors which this team can theoretically explore is
limited only by the amount of time and money available. Intra-team communication is
often difficult and subject to misunderstanding because each member works independently
and at separate locations. The lead designer, usually an architect or engineer, is responsible
for sorting out the particular concern of each speciality and explaining the problems and
benefits which flow from the interactions of the specialists' work to the client. Unfortu-
nately, for each member of the design team there will be certain strategies and solutions that
are so commonplace that there may be a failure to anticipate and therefore disclose to the
designer in charge the negative implications these solutions may have for the particular
client.
56. Cf. Comment, Educational Malpractice, 124 U. PA. L. Rnv. 755, 765 (1974) (dis-
cussing same argument in field of education).
57. See text accompanying notes 69-74 & 87-90 infra.
58. PRossER, supra note 18, § 12, at 51; Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 747, 441 P.2d
912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968); Battella v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240-41, 176 N.E.2d
729,731,219 N.Y.S.2d 34,37 (1961). Prosser was particularly critical of this argument: "It is
the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of
litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court ofjustice to
deny relief on such grounds." PRossER, supra note 18, § 12, at 51 & n.38.
59. See note 4 supra.
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when the proposed cause of action shifts losses from client to designer,
some professionals, in the absence of insurance, will respond by choos-
ing to engage in safer activities. 60 If designers leave the field alto-
gether, as have some physicians because of the soaring costs of
malpractice insurance, a shortage of necessary service providers could
result at the unlikely extreme. Even with some decrease, the majority
of remaining practitioners may tend to be either judgment-proof or
wealthy enough to self-insure. If malpractice insurance is mandatory,
as it is now for work on most public and institutional projects, it may
be extremely difficult for all but the wealthiest professionals to enter
the practice of design for these facilities. One possible result, again at
the extreme, would be an oligarchy among the remaining firms.
The apparent impact of this doomsday scenario may be reduced to
less disastrous proportions if one remembers that insurance against
damage resulting from a failure to inform is for the protection of the
designer and the client, not third parties. Designers and clients are
therefore in a position to bargain concerning the direct allocation of the
cost of risk spreading. 61 The availability of insurance also serves to put
a price on the risks which would result from the proposed cause of
action. Once identified, this cost may be borne directly by the profes-
sional through self-insurance, or the client may externalize the expense
by requiring the designer to insure.62
Balanced against burdens upon design professionals which may
foreseeably result from recognition of the proposed cause of action are
a number of benefits to both clients and designers. For example, it is
impossible for a client to know whether additional time and money will
be necessary to diminish or eliminate uncertainties in outcome without
first being informed of those aspects of the proposed design solution
which may lead to uncertain final results.63 The designer's explicit rec-
ognition of uncertainty also benefits clients by leading to introspection
60. This is what Professor Calabresi calls general, or market, deterrence. See generally
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-94 (1970).
61. See generally Calabresi, Views and Overviews, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 600, 607; Blum &
Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi-4uto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U.
CHI. L. REV. 239, 249 n.26 (1967).
62. In the second case, the client is more likely to face a design cost which directly
reflects both the relative magnitude of risks inherent in the type, size and complexity of the
client's particular project and the relative competency of the designer based on the-profes-
sional's qualifications, past work, and claims experience.
63. In terms of scientific decision analysis it is possible to put a price on the next incre-
ment of information gathering and weigh the additional cost against the increased odds of a
desirable outcome. See Howard, Decision Analysis in Systems Engineering, in SYSTEMS
CONCEPTS: LECTURES ON CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO SYSTEMS (R. Miles ed. 1973);
C. CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMS APPROACH (1968).
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which will encourage the designer to work more carefully.64 Even the
availability of insurance would be unlikely to weaken the impetus to
use more care because practitioners will fear that any malpractice
claims will increase deductibles and premiums, and might eventually
result in uninsurability.
Both designer and client will benefit from a greater exchange of
information to the extent that the quality of the final design is im-
proved, because two heads are usually better than one in generating a
wider range of appropriate solutions. 65 In addition to enhancing client
satisfaction,66 and therefore hopefully leading to the growth of client
demand, involving the client in the process of evaluating risks and al-
ternatives may prove a useful form of insurance against future mal-
practice claims. By encouraging the client to reject or ratify design
decisions, the designer tosome extent may insure that the result of a
failure to achieve an expected outcome is not an automatic lawsuit.
The more the client is informed, the greater will be his or her intellec-
tual and emotional stake in the project with the result that, to a limited
extent, the client can then be said to have assumed the disclosed risks.
The designer's use of this reasoning as a defense is likely to have
greater weight with the factfimder than a similar defense would have in
a medical informed consent case. In a medical informed consent case,
a jury may tend to discount this response because of the assumption
that only another physician realistically could have comprehended the
information provided. Injuries in design cases of the type under discus-
sion are economic, not bodily, and the relationship between designer
and client is not marked by emergency or coercion. Clients are there-
fore far more likely to be held to have assumed responsibility for pro-
ceeding after the risks have been reasonably disclosed.
Problems of Proof
An action for failure to inform calls for the application of conven-
tional tort doctrines. The action sounds in negligence and therefore
requires the plaintiff to establish a duty, a breach of the duty, a causal
connection between breach and the harm suffered, and the measure of
damages. 67 The definition of the standard of disclosure required of a
defendant designer necessarily describes the limits of breach. This def-
inition should focus on the materiality of the information which is al-
leged not to have been communicated to the client, a standard which, it
is submitted, should require evidence that but for or substantially be-
64. See Wade, The4ttomeyS Labiityfor Negligence, in PROFESSIoNAL NEGLIGENCE
238 & n.142 (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
65. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
66. See note 53 supra.
67. PRossER, supra note 18, § 30, at 143.
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cause of the absence of certain material information a reasonable client
under the particular client's circumstances would have made decisions
leading to measurably better results. Use of an objective, reasonable
client standard provides a significant limit to the designer's liability,
while also freeing plaintiffs from reliance on a standard of disclosure
set by the profession. Once the client has met the requisite burden of
proof, an appropriate rule of measurement must then be defined for
use in proving damages. In addition, the proposed cause of action
raises certain special considerations with respect to the application of a
statute of limitations.
Standard of Disclosure-The Reasonable Client
There are two possible bases for a standard of disclosure as ap-
plied to design professionals. One basis is the profession itself, which
defines adequate disclosure as that which a reasonable practitioner
would have made under the circumstances. 68 This standard is gener-
ally parallel to the standard of liability in medical negligence cases. As
long as the source of the appropriate standard is the profession itself, its
definition requires expert testimony.
The other possible basis, the one proposed here for use in designer
failure-to-inform cases, is the factfinder's conception of the needs of a
reasonable client under the particular client's circumstances. This stan-
dard is similar to the approach taken by a growing number of jurisdic-
tions in medical informed consent cases69 and adopted by federal
courts in interpreting the disclosure requirements of the Securities Ex-
change Regulations.70 A strictly subjective standard using the particu-
lar client as the only reference for appropriate disclosure would
unfairly burden the defendant, because the client's bitter hindsight is
easily subject to the distortion borne of dissatisfaction with the results
of the designer's services. 7' The proposed standard should therefore be
68. This is analogous to the standard applied in medical informed consent cases before
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See also
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (1960); Aiken v. Clary, 396
S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965); cases cited in Meisel, supra note 36, at 94 n.118. The standard
is "what is customary and usual in the profession." Meisel, supra note 36, at 93. See also
PROSSER, supra note 18, § 32, at 165; 1 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE 1 8.04, at 200 (1977).
69. For pre-1976 cases following Canterbury, see Meisel, supra note 36, at 98 n.128.
More recent cases include Niblack v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 383, 387-89 (D. Colo.
1977); Johnson v. United States, 547 F.2d 688, 692 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Schroeder v. Law-
rence, 359 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (Mass. 1977). Contra, Walker v. North Dakota Eye Clinic,
Ltd., 415 F. Supp. 891, 895 (N.E.D.N.D. 1976); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 649-50, 222
S.E.2d 783, 787 (1976).
70. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445-50 (1976). See also Reyes v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
71. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 409
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defimed in terms of what a reasonable client in like circumstances
would consider important or significant.72 Relevant client characteris-
tics may include previous experience with design professionals and
services of the same type; the client's access to special technical advice
as, for example, in the case of large industrial firms with in-house engi-
neering staffs; what the client knows or should know of trade or indus-
try custom, particularly with respect to retaining independent
consultants; the client's sophistication and expertise in the area; and
any special information which should have put the client on notice and
provided an opportunity to avoid harm.
The use of an objective, reasonable client approach lessens the
practical problem of plaintiffs being completely dependent upon self-
serving standards of disclosure set by the profession itself.73 The role
of the expert must therefore be clearly delineated. Professional custom
should not be required to provide a defimition of the needs of a reason-
able client because this is not a subject which can only be evaluated
through application of the designer's special skills and knowledge. 74
Although expert testimony may be necessary to establish the existence
of risks and alternatives to a particular design solution, the materiality
of information about risks and alternatives to a reasonable client under
the plaintiffs circumstances is an issue that should be resolved without
reliance on expert testimony.
The proposed cause of action would appear not to provide a situa-
tion suitable for application of the doctrine of comparative negligence.
The client's need for information should be determined by an objective
standard and in the absence of information to the contrary, the de-
signer should be entitled to rely on the client's reasonableness. 75 Thus,
U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,245,503 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515
(1972). It is not realistic to extend the arguments presented by Goldstein, supra note 37,
concerning the need to use a subjective standard for the duty to inform because the relation-
ship between designer and client is economic and the client's dignitary interests are not
directly threatened by the state or someone, for example, a physician, with the appearance of
greater power.
72. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 108, at 719.
73. See note 68 supra.
74. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972). This approach avoids the barrier imposed, for example, in legal malpractice cases
where the standard of care excuses "mere errors ofjudgment." Note, Attorney Mapractice,
63 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1292, 1299, 1312 & n.167 (1963); accord, Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,
591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (1961) (holding this to be the general rule).
One commentator has argued that it was just such factors causing deserving plaintiffs to
be non-suited which encouraged both courts and plaintiffs to seek causes of action framed
differently from conventional negligence as a means of expanding available avenues for
seeking redress. See Meisel, supra note 36, at 63-65. To the extent that courts still required
that the standard of disclosure be determined by reference to the profession itself, the effort
was, and is, effectively sabotaged.
75. Because the relationship between designer and client is not an adversary economic
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if a jury found that after the designer's disclosure the client acted un-
reasonably in not comprehending the information conveyed or not
seeking clarification of any information not understood, the designer
would not be liable for an allegedly undesirable outcome. The jury
would necessarily have found that the designer's duty had been com-
pletely discharged. In other circumstances, however, the designer may
be held fully liable for claims of clients who had made apparently fool-
ish or irrational decisions.76 For example, if the Empress Dowager de-
manded a marble ship, the naval architect applying a reasonable
person standard of disclosure might not be required to inform her of
the risk of unseaworthiness !f the architect could reasonably assume
that the Empress was, in fact, rational and did not expect the ship to
float.77 If, on the other hand, the architect could be charged with an
awareness of the Empress' misconceptions, absent disclosure, the mo-
ment the ship sank she would have a valid complaint for the architect's
failure to inform and would be entitled to a full recovery.
It should be noted that the proposed standard of disclosure stops
short of requiring that the client actually comprehend communicated
information concerning risks and alternatives. A duty to insure com-
prehension has been proposed as the ideal standard in the context of
medical services in order to assure that the patient makes "good" deci-
sions.78 This argument is not as convincing in the context of design
because there is not the same disparity in apparent power between pa-
relationship, as it would be between buyers and sellers in the market place, the client should
not be required to exercise due diligence in actively seeking information other than that
conveyed by the designer he or she has retained. Compare the analysis and review of recent
judicial interpretations of the requirement of justifiable reliance implied by Securities Ex-
change Commission Rule lOb-5, in Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014-20 (5th Cir. 1977).
76. The requirement that the designer give information which would be desired by a
reasonable client in the particular client's position introduces an element of subjectivity
needed to protect the particular client's ability to make idiosyncratic decisions. See Capron,
Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340,
410 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Capron].
77. If the client refuses to consider the professional's advice and warnings there should
not be liability. Cf. the recent New York informed consent statute providing:
"4. It shall be a defense to any action for medical malpractice based upon an
alleged failure to obtain. . . an informed consent that:
(b) the patient assured the medical practitioner he would undergo treatment...
regardless of the risk involved, or the patient indicated to the medical practitioner
that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to
be informed. .. ."
NEW YORK PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney Supp. 1977).
78. See note 50 supra. Some commentators have argued that, at least in the context of
medical informed consent actions, the physician ideally has the duty to assure that the pa-
tient actually comprehends the information given. See, e.g., Capron, Informed Consent in
Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 410 (1974); Meisel,
supra note 36, at 113-23. This was in response to Judge Robinson's comment in Canterbury
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tients and physicians,79 and design services are not rendered in an at-
mosphere of emergency. The information communicated should
however, provide a reasonable opportunity for comprehension.80 Cer-
tain blanket forms of disclosure therefore may be clearly noninforma-
tive. Examples include a physician's warning that "you might die" or
an architect's statement that a house might be "hard to heat."
The Materiality of Risks and Alternatives
Communication between designers and their clients often covers a
wide range of subjects, usually takes place over periods ranging from
several months to several years, and is marked by informality. Bad
results may only appear after a project is completed, at a time which is
usually at least a year and possibly as long as fifteen years after the
design phase.81 During the designer-client relationship there may have
been extensive discussions of design solutions which in the end were
not employed or which did not lead to "bad results." Similarly, there
may have been little or no discussion concerning those design decisions
which eventually became the basis for a lawsuit. These practical
problems of proof are compounded by the legal task of defining, for
each factual situation, what the client should have been told.
The reasonable client standard may also be applied to separate
those risks and alternatives which should have been communicated
from those which may be considered relatively trivial or unrelated,
those which are common knowledge, or those of which the plaintiff,
because of special circumstances,82 should have been aware. Expert
testimony may well be required to determine the range of information
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,780 n.15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), limiting the
duty of the physician to that of disclosing, not informing, the patient.
79. Goldstein, supra note 37, at 690-98.
80. There is little likelihood however, that design clients will require, or be willing to
pay for, total disclosure of all known or discoverable risks. Such disclosure, if made, might
be couched in terms so foreign that common experience would fail as a guide to
comprehension.
In an experiment patients were informed in terms of probabilities about the risks of
using a drug called "acetylhydroxylbenzoate" after which disclosure, 21 of 66 subjects re-
fused to take the drug as a headache remedy. After learning that this drug was actually
aspirin, however, 20 of the 21 then said their future use of aspirin would be unaffected.
Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent: Form or Substance, 123 ARCH. Irr. MED.
682, 684 (1969), cited in Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation
of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 124, at 133-34.
81. The basic concepts for the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit system were
outlined in an engineer's report in 1956. The system began operation in 1974, 18 years later.
See generally McDonald & Smart, Inc., A History of the Key Decisions in the Development
of Bay Area Rapid Transit (1975) (prepared for the Metropolitan Transportation Commis-
sion) (National Technical Information Service Doec.).
82. These special circumstances include noise next to railroad tracks, rust on metal
buildings near the sea, or risks which the client, because of technical expertise equivalent or
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available to the competent practitioner. When the factfmder then de-
termines which information should have been considered material by
the reasonable client, a judgment is also being made concerning the
appropriate expectations of the reasonable practitioner with respect to
the needs of that client. A reasonableness standard should therefore
prevent the designer from being held responsible for an in-depth exam-
ination of such factors as the relative costs and feasibility of al alterna-
tives. Such work can be very costly because often the only means of
accurately evaluating alternative solutions is first to design them. Rea-
sonable disclosure, moreover, has other limits. As stated by the
Supreme Court of California in the context of medical informed con-
sent: "[T]he patient's interest in information does not extend to a
lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications. A mini-
course in medical science is not required." 83
The standard of disclosure should also hold the designer accounta-
ble for any knowledge he or she actually or reasonably should have
possessed concerning the particular client's needs. The standard of dis-
closure proposed in the liberal medical informed consent cases explic-
itly recognizes the likelihood of such knowledge. In the leading case of
Canterbury v. Spence,84 the court adopted a definition of materiality of
the risks for which physicians would be held accountable in failure-to-
disclose cases as those which a reasonable person "in what the physi-
cian knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely
to attach significance to. . . in deciding whether or not to forego the
proposed therapy." 85 The underlying assumption is that the patient is
superior to that of the designer in the particular subject matter, should have been aware or
had the means to discover.
83. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972);
accord, ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 25, 499 P.2d 1, 9 (1972).
84. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
85. Id. at 787 (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.
L. REv. 628, 640 (1970)); accord, Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689
(1972). Meisel, supra note 36, at 87, offers a more general description of the scope of infor-
mation required by the informed consent cases of the past 15 years: (a) the nature of the
ailment; (b) the nature of the proposed treatment; (c) the probability of success; (d) the risks
inherent in the proposed treatment; and, (e) possible alternatives.
The court in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972), suggested that some expert testimony on this question would be helpful because the
physician can sense "on the basis of his medical training and experience.. . [what] the
average, reasonable patient" would want to know. Id. at 787.
The United States Supreme Court has considered a standard of materiality in the con-
text of the disclosure required by the Securities Exchange Regulations. The Court rejected a
definition of "material" facts as those "which a reasonable shareholder might consider im-
portant," TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), because the "might"
formulation was "too suggestive of mere possibility, however unlikely." The definition
adopted instead was that "an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in determining how to vote." Id. (em-
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not anonymous but is, or should be, a person whose needs and wants
are known to the treating physician. There is even more reason for a
designer's client not to be treated as anonymous, because the designer-
client relationship transpires in circumstances which do not have the
air of emergency so common to the delivery of medical care. The bur-
den imposed on designers by a client-centered standard therefore
would not appear to be unduly harsh.86
Although no expert testimony may be required to determine the
standard of care, the jury will still be required to weigh conflicting ex-
pert testimony concerning the existence of material alternatives and
may thus be bound by the testimony of a single expert witness. This
aspect of proof should therefore serve to limit a plaintiff's use of the
claim for failure to inform to those cases where the available alterna-
tives were sufficiently clear and material to elicit the necessary expert
evidence.
Damages
The measure of damages is a- critical element of the proposed
cause of action. In addition to establishing the magnitude of the al-
leged harm, proof of damage establishes the fact of harm by showing
that but for the failure to inform, the client would have experienced
measurably better results from the defendant's services. It is submitted
that the measure should limit client damages to those costs of imple-
menting a reasonable alternative that would be incurred at the time this
alternative is or should have been discovered which are in excess of the
cost of implementing the alternative at the time of initial construction.
In appropriate cases the plaintiff should also be allowed compensation
phasis added). This test is replaced in the proposed cause of action by the necessity of
proving causation. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (2)(a) (1976).
86. Compare the approach taken by the courts in securities regulation cases where, for
example, a corporation issuing a proxy statement cannot possibly be held responsible for
knowing the range of individual investors' financial choices or investment goals. In securi-
ties cases, the courts begin with the premise that underlying objective facts exist. In deter-
mining whether these should have been disclosed, proof of a causal connection to a
shareholder's injury is not required. It is not necessary to show that but for the absence of
disclosure, the investor would, in the case of a proxy statement, have voted otherwise. In-
stead, as the Court held in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), all
that is required is a showing that, under the circumstances as related to the investment, not
the particular investor, the omitted facts would have been considered significant by the
shareholder in shaping a decision on the matter, that is, "the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of informa-
tion made available."
As the designer's duty to inform is not statutory, such strict liability is inappropriate and
therefore, as discussed previously, see text accompanying note 67 supra, liability requires
proof of a causal connection between the failure to inform and a resulting injury.
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for the loss of "comfort and enjoyment,"87 if the property is for per-
sonal use, or for lost profits, if it is for business use, during the time the
structure's use was impaired due to materialized risks which could
otherwise have been avoided. Any additional operating or mainte-
nance costs attributable to the structure's bad performance until the
time of correction should also be included.
Two concerns arise in connection with the calculation of damages
for a failure to inform. The first concern is the need for the plaintiff to
show the existence, probable performance, costs, and reasonableness of
the claimed alternatives. To this extent proving damages involves is-
sues similar to those encountered when establishing the standard of dis-
closure. The alternatives serve as a benchmark from which to measure
both the diminished performance of what, in fact, was received,
thereby determining the amount of damage for the loss of beneficial
use and enjoyment, and for determining the cost saving, if any, which
would have resulted had the alternative been implemented during con-
struction in place of the design actually chosen.
The problems involved in establishing this benchmark are sub-
stantial, but comparable to the problems encountered in the application
of the informed consent doctrine to medical and legal services. For
example, in actions against physicians for failure to secure informed
consent, the benchmark is the patient's state of health and relative free-
dom from pain and suffering either before the risk of which the physi-
cian failed to warn materialized, or as it would have been if an
alternative, and presumably less risky, procedure had been successfully
performed.88
87. Ragland v. Clarson, 259 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
88. The specific issue of the damages proximately resulting from a physician's failure
to inform has rarely been addressed. One interesting case concerns a suit by parents for the
"wrongful life" of a child born with severe defects because the physician giving prenatal care
negligently failed to diagnose the mother's illness during pregnancy. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). The Texas Supreme Court held that damages were to be measured
solely by the expenses reasonably necessary for the care and treatment of the child's impair-
ment, allowing no recovery for pain and suffering or other costs that might have been
avoided. Id. at 849.
Some commentators suggest that damages for a physician's failure to inform be calcu-
lated as "the difference between [the patient's] condition with no treatment and his condi-
tion after the undisclosed risk materialized." Waltz and Scheuneman, Inforred Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628, 649 (1970). They admit, however, that the possibility of
alternative treatments makes the case "more difficult." They suggest that this would be the
appropriate circumstance to use the measure of the loss resulting from the risk which materi-
alized, whether or not the therapy was carefully performed. This measure was proposed in
dictum in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (1960).
In the securities regulation cases, the starting place for the measure of damages caused
by misrepresentation will usually be the opportunities in terms of market value which, but
for the defendant's action, the plaintiff would have enjoyed as a reasonable investor. In
addition, courts may award prejudgment interest to the extent that a defendant's misrepre-
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Finding the benchmark of alternatives with better results is the
one element of proof of the proposed cause of action which requires
plaintiffs to present expert testimony. The experts' task will be similar
to that which medical experts face in describing the probable outcome
of a patient's illness if a reasonable patient under the particular circum-
stances had not consented to the treatment given. The only difference
is that the designer begins by working with a clean slate, not a preexist-
ing defective structure, and therefore the evidence required need only
establish the existence and relative costs of the reasonable reduced-risk
alternatives which were available in the appropriate market at the time
the negligence occurred.
The second concern arising in connection with the calculation of
damages is the question of whether tort recovery theory not limited as
suggested in this Note would award too much. The issue is best seen in
the context of the example in which high ceilings in the living rooms of
a house lead to higher heating bills and less than optimal comfort.
Leaving aside the possibility that the client unjustifiably relied on the
designer and should have known these problems commonly accom-
pany this design approach, there are several possible measures of the
harm suffered. The conventional tort recovery would be measured by
the cost of making the plaintiff whole, perhaps the cost of larger hear-
ing systems, more insulation, or the discounted present value of future
excess heating costs.
This measure seems unfair because the client is unjustly enriched.
Absent negligence in the actual construction, the client did in fact re-
ceive what was bargained for, a house with open ceilings which make
certain rooms appear more spacious. The client did not originally pay
the additional costs of a larger heating system or more insulation re-
quired to secure both the feeling of spaciousness and a comfortable
room on a winter day.89 Strict application of the out-of-pocket rule in
sentations are shown to have deprived the plaintiff of funds for other gainful purposes. Cant
v. A.G. Becker & Co. 384 F. Supp. 814, 815 (N.D. 111. 1974). Thus the critical variables are
time and relevant market value, and these may be adjusted to return the plaintiff as near as
possible to a "pre-harm" status. For example, where misrepresentationy as to material facts
concerning a security's value are held to have caused the plaintiff to enter a harmful transac-
tion, the pre-harm state may be the price paid and the damages can therefore be measured
by any decrease in value as of the date the fraud was, or should reasonably have been,
discovered. Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43 (10th Cir. 1971). This is the earliest
time at which the complaining party is in a position to seek relief and to mitigate damages.
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 346 F. Supp. 443, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
89. See Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954), in which the defendant
soil driller was engaged at an hourly rate to test for the presence of fill on two lots which the
plaintiff intended to purchase. As the defendant negligently reported finding far less fill
than actually existed, plaintiff was awarded damages measured by the increased cost of the
structural footings required because of the fill. The California Supreme Court, per Justice
Traynor, upset the award as being improperly measured. The court reasoned that given the
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this type of situation, however, would therefore lead to the conclusion
that there had been no actual damage.
Yet the client has been harmed. But for the designer's failure to
inform, the client, as a reasonable person, would have chosen to avoid,
or at least mitigate, the bad results. The direct result of the designer's
negligence, therefore, is to deprive the client of reasonable alternatives
and thus to interfere with the client's beneficial use and enjoyment of
the property until the problem is corrected. In the example above,
damages therefore should include any additional costs necessary to
keep the house warm. There is, however, some authority for limiting
the costs of correction, even in a tort action, so that if the costs are no
greater, after adjusting for inflation, than they would have been at the
time the house was first constructed, the costs of correction should not
be chargeable to the designer's failure to inform.90 Under the proposed
measure the designer is still liable for what in a contract action would
be the consequential damage of lost profits or comfort.and enjoyment,
as well as any additional operating and maintenance costs which would
otherwise have been avoided. In the case of business property it is im-
portant to remember that the designer did not guarantee any level of
profit. Damages should therefore only be those profits which the de-
fendant's negligence actually prevented the plaintiff from realizing and
which were otherwise reasonably certain to have accrued from an alter-
native course of action.
The proposed measure thus combines tort and contract concepts.
It is designed to complement a duty to inform as distinguished from a
duty which would have the professional insure the quality of the final
results.
Limitation of Actions
The outcome of many malpractice cases hinges on the peculiarities
of the applicable statute of limitations and its judicial interpretation.
Questions of commencement and expiration are especially critical in
architecture and engineering cases because of the longevity of both the
construction process and the expected period of satisfactory project
performance, as well as the complexity of the forces which may interact
to bring about bad results. Damage may occur many years after a pro-
ject is completed, but long before failure is expected. Clients may then
decision to build, the defendant did not insure against the costs of building foundations; fill
was a physical attribute of the land and the costs of adequate foundations were inevitable.
Thus, compensable damage could only result to the extent that the defendant's false report
induced the plaintiff to pay more for the lots than they were worth. If the lots were worth
what the plaintiff paid, there was no damage. See also Kellog v. Pizza Oven, Inc., 157 Colo.
295, 402 P.2d 633 (1965).
90. See note 87 supra.
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take even longer to connect their injury to the designer's negligence or
to the possibility that harm could have been avoided by adequate dis-
closure. In an ordinary bodily injury or property damage case, in com-
parison, the negligent act, the sustaining of damage, and the discovery
of the injury are practically simultaneous. In design cases these events
may be separated by many years, and the client may not question the
information originally received unless, or until, the extent of damage
requires remedial action and consultation with another professional.
Characterization of Claim and the Applicable Period
The outcome of a statute of limitations defense has often been de-
termined by the plaintiffs pleading. In some states the statutory period
for contract actions is significantly longer than for torts,91 and plaintiffs
have met with varying success by "theory shopping" in the phrasing of
their complaints.92 In response to this problem, and to heavy lobbying
by the design profession and the construction industry, most states have
now enacted statutes which specifically limit the time during which an
action may be brought against designers, including architects and engi-
neers, building contractors, and in some cases, material-suppliers, for
personal or economic injuries resulting from defects in improvements
to real estate.93 The problem of the characterization of a claim for fail-
91. See, eg., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 260, § I (West 1970) (20-year limit from the
time the cause of action accrues for actions on contract); § 214 (three years for malpractice
actions).
92. For example, in Skidmore, Owings & Merrill v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 25
Conn. Supp. 76, 197 A.2d 83 (1963), the owner sought damages resulting from the architect's
negligent specification for the coolant to be used in the heating and air conditioning system.
As a result of the error the plumbing corroded. The statute of limitations for torts was one
year from date of injury or three years from the date of the negligent act, and there was a
six-year limitation period for breach of contract. The court suggested that the longer period
should apply and indicated that the basis for the complaint was the architect's breach of the
contractual duty to design, supervise and inspect.
In contrast, in Bales for Food, Inc. v. Poole, 246 Or. 253, 424 P.2d 892 (1967), the owner
alleged that the building was incorrectly located by the engineer, making the parking lot too
small. The complaint alleged a breach of the engineer's contract for professional services,
governed by a six-year statute, rather than negligence, which was subject to a two-year limit.
The court reluctantly relied upon an analogy with medical malpractice cases in holding that
the failure to exercise due care is a tort. Id. at 256, 424 P.2d at 893. In 1971 the legislature
responded with OR. Rv. STAT. § 12.135 (1977), requiring that actions for architects' and
engineers' malpractice be commenced within two years from the date of injury and not more
than 10 years from the date of substantial completion.
The malpractice of failure to inform would easily be subject to the same uncertainty of
characterization as the negligence in the examples above. Several New York lower courts
have solved the analagous question for medical informed consent actions by choosing to
apply the statute for malpractice and personal injury rather than the limit governing actions
for assault and battery. See Abril v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 112, 364 N.Y.S.2d 281
(1975); Brnse v. Brickner, 78 Misc. 2d 999, 359 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1974).
93. See Comment, Limitation ofAction Statutesfor Architects and Builders-Blueprints
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ure to inform has thus been solved by legislation.
Commencement of the Statutory Period
Most designer-builder limitation statutes have also resolved the is-
sue of the commencement of the statutory period. The typical maxi-
mum period limit begins to run at the time of substantial completion of
the real property improvements which are the source of the claim.94
Some statutes also provide for a shorter period which begins to run
when "the claim arises, ' 95 "when a cause of action accrues," 96 at the
time of injury or damage, 97 or at the time of discovery of damage. 98
From the client's viewpoint the best protection of potential rights
of action for a designer's failure to inform is a rule which tolls the stat-
ute until the discovery of a defect coupled with knowledge that, but for
the failure to inform, the damage could reasonably have been avoided.
The approach would involve proof of two questions of fact: the time
for Non-action, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 361, 361 n.l (1969), reporting that as of 1969 some 30
states had passed such statutes. The number is now 46, including the District of Columbia;
only Arizona, Iowa, New York, Vermont and West Virginia do not have such statutes. To
give additional protection to third parties, most statutes limit their coverage to those engaged
in the planning or construction of a structure, specifically exempting owners or those in
possession and control of the premises after completion. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
337.1 (West 1972); OR. REv. STAT. § 12.135 (1977). The distinction is based upon the doc-
trine that the latter group has a continuing duty to third persons to use reasonable care to
keep the premises safe.
In six states this distinction has been successfully attacked as violative of the state or
federal constitutional equal protection clauses. See Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride,
292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Skin-
ner v. Anderson, 38 IlM. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.
1973); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Kallas
Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
In nine other states these statutes have withstood attack as discrimination reasonably
related to a legitimate state purpose. See, e.g., Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455
S.W.2d 918 (1970); Nevada Lakeshore Co., Inc. v. Diamond Electric, Inc., 89 Nev. 293, 511
P.2d 113 (1973); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 59 N.J. 364, 293 A.2d 662 (1972);
Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d 214 (N.M. 1977); Sosnow v. Paul, 43 App. Div. 2d 978, 352
N.Y.S.2d 504 (1974), affd, 36 N.Y.2d 693 (1975); Joseph v. Bums, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203
(1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978); Good v.
Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); Yakima Fruit and Cold Stor. Co. v. Central Heating
& Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
94. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (1974) specifies the earliest of, inter alia, sub-
stantial completion, completion according to the contract, commencement of the statute as
provided for in the contract, date of payment in full for the particular phase of the work in
issue, or the date of the owner's acceptance of the work.
95. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-127 (1973).
96. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108 (1974) (when the injury or damage
occurs); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 2B (West Supp. 1977) (three years after the claim
accrues in tort actions).
97. OR. REv. STAT. § 12.135 (1977).
98. ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 752-A (Supp. 1978-79); NEn. REv. STAT. § 25-222 (1975).
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when the damage should have been discovered and the time when the
existence of information concerning risks and alternatives which would
have lead to a different, and better, design decision should have been
discovered. Patent defects present no problem, because the reasonable
client is put on notice the first time a roof leaks or it appears to be
impossible to maintain the temperature of a room at a comfortable
level. Some allowance should be made, however, for latent defects, for
example, structural dry rot resulting from a hidden leak in a roof or
wall. It may be necessary to allow a longer, although not indetermi-
nate, period for claims for deficiencies which could not have been dis-
covered by reasonable inspection. 99
The time of discovery of the defect which has caused economic
damage is also the logical point to charge the plaintiff with knowledge
of the existence of information concerning risks and alternatives not
communicated during the design phase, which form the basis of the
complaint for failure to inform. Discovery of damage should cause the
reasonable client to inquire not only about solutions to the problem but
also about the possibility that it could have been prevented. Time of
discovery is a far more favorable standard than one based upon the
time at which the negligence occurs. 10
The logical way to control the period of liability in actions for fail-
ure to inform will be to combine the substantial completion and time of
discovery rules. Time of completion will mark the beginning of the
absolute limitation period. If damage is discovered at any time within
that period the discovery will begin the running of a shorter period on
the basis that the reasonable client has been put on notice of a need to
search the design process for any negligence, including the possibility
of the designer's failure to inform.
Conclusion
Recognition of the cause of action proposed in this Note is both
necessary and practical. It is supported by a number of policy ration-
ales including the changing role of the design professional and the in-
99. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (West Supp. 1978) (allowing four years for patent
defects); § 337-15 (allowing 10 years for latent defects). The Mississippi statute provides a
10 year limit. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (Supp. 1978).
Note that the California statute for patent defects specifically exempts owner-occupied
single-unit residences. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 337.1(f)(West Supp. 1978), probably as a
result of the judicial trend towards treating tract housing according to strict product liability
doctrine. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Contra, City of
Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 n.4 (Minn. 1978).
100. E.g., Sosnow v. Paul, 43 App. Div. 2d 978, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1974), affd, 36
N.Y.2d 780, 369 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1975). Contra, Seger v. Comwell, 44 Misc. 2d 994, 255
N.Y.S.2d 744 (1964).
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creased use of performance specifications, the increasing complexity of
the structures designed, and a growing concern with the accountability
of service providers in general. Even the architectural profession has
come to recognize a responsibility for adequate disclosure to clients.
Certain benefits to both clients and designers should help offset the
burden which may be imposed upon designers as a result of recognition
of expanded grounds for liability. Such benefits include the self-scru-
tiny encouraged by the duty to inform as well as the increased satisfac-
tion of clients who, because of being continually informed, will have
ratified the significant decisions made in the course of design.
The legal doctrines which have provided the basis for recognition
of professional negligence resulting from a failure to inform of risks
and alternatives in the context of medical treatment provide useful
analogies for application to design. Additional, although limited, sup-
port also comes from the attorney's analogous duties in the field of
criminal law. Because design is a service, not a product, the designer's
conduct must be judged in accordance with the standard of reasonable
care imposed by basic tort doctrine. Thus, the only doctrinal advance-
ment involved is the focus of the proposed cause of action on the nature
of the communication between designer and client during the design
process in addition to the conventional concerns with malpractice in
the formulation of the plans and specifications which are the typical
products of that process. The law of agency provides further support
for the proposed duty if it is recognized that in design, as well as in the
supervision of the construction phase of services, the designer functions
like an agent whose decisions may bind the client as principal. The
designer must therefore keep the client fully informed.
The proposed cause of action involves a number of manageable
problems of proof which can be defined to assure that plaintiffs will not
be stymied by dependence upon standards of disclosure set by the pro-
fession. It is also necessary to assure that, as potential defendants, de-
sign professionals are not burdened by strict liability for any and all of
their particular client's complaints with the finished product. The re-
sult should be an objective standard of requisite disclosure for use in
determining negligence. Proof of causation would then require a show-
ing of the availability of alternatives leading to quantifiably better out-
comes or less risk. Finally, the measure of damages must be adjusted
to assure only restitution and to prevent any unjust enrichment.
Recognition of the proposed cause of action is not intended to pro-
vide just one more weapon in the arsenal of plaintiffs attorneys. It is
meant, instead, to focus attention on a critical phase of the design proc-
ess which, when performed properly, may avoid many of the harms
which are the basis for conventional malpractice suits. Seen in this
light, recognition of the proposed duty is not an unreasonable extension
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
DESIGN PROFESSIONALS
of tort law,10 ' but long overdue.
101. As Prosser once commented, tort law must have the flexibility to recognize such
new claims: "[T]he progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first impression,
in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of action where none had been
recognized before .... The law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its develop-
ment are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal
protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not
of itself operate as a bar to recovery." PRossF.R, supra note 18, § I, at 3 (footnote omitted).
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